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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF DIVIDEND POLICY IN REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
BY
NAN LIU
July, 2011

Committee Chair:
Major Academic Unit:

Lawrence Brown
School of Accountancy

Given the importance of historical dividend policy to firms, I investigate whether
dividend payers manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and
dividend payout ratios. Using Compustat’s Execucomp database, I find evidence that
dividend policy impacts both upward and downward real earnings management. I find
that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of
pre-managed earnings relative to prior year dividends when pre-managed earnings are
lower than dividends paid in the prior year, suggesting that dividend levels are an
important earnings benchmark. I document a stronger relationship between changes in
pre-managed earnings and real earnings management for payers than for non-payers,
suggesting that dividend policies impact real earnings management. Consistent with the
importance of dividend policy in real earnings management, I show that dividend payers
that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a greater extent than
dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It is well known that managers try to maintain their firms‟ dividend levels and
dividend pay-out ratios. Lintner (1956) documents that dividends paid in the current year
are a function of target pay-out ratios, current earnings, and dividends paid out in the
prior year. Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) show that dividend-payers try to
smooth yearly dividend streams and maintain consistency with their past dividend
policies, e.g., dividend levels and payout ratios. 1 I examine the role of smoothing
dividend levels and dividend payout ratios in real earnings management.
Lintner (1956) argues that dividend policy is the primary decision criterion in
determining how earnings are distributed between current dividends and retained
earnings. Dividend policies include setting the existing dividend as the central benchmark,
targeting a relatively fixed payout ratio, determining whether and how much to change
dividend payments based on changes in earnings, and making partial adjustment to what
is suggested by changes in earnings. Lintner (1956, p. 100) finds that managers feel
pressure to increase dividends when there is a substantial increase in profitability because
of “their fiduciary responsibilities and standards of fairness”. Twenty-six of the 28 sample
companies in his study had specific target payout ratios that were invariant over long
periods of time. More recent survey papers suggest that about half of firms have explicit
target dividend payout ratios (Baker and Powell, 2000; Baker, Veit and Powell, 2001).
Consistent with dividends being an important earnings target, Daniel, Denis and Naveen
1

The dividend payout ratio is the dividend level divided by the earnings level.

1

(2008) find that dividend payers with debt manipulate accruals upward to attain dividend
targets when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends.
Dividend levels are a more important target than dividend payout ratios (Baker
and Powell, 2000; Baker et al., 2001; Brav et al. 2005). Thus, I argue that the dividend
level decision is made before the dividend payout ratio decision. When pre-managed
earnings fall short of expected dividends, maintaining the expected dividend results in a
payout ratio of over 100 percent, giving rise to the problem of dividend sustainability.
Manipulating earnings upward through real activities increases firms‟ ability to pay cash
dividends and makes the payout ratio more sustainable. I expect dividend payers to
manipulate earnings upward to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to
expected dividends. On the other hand, when pre-managed earnings exceed expected
dividends, if dividend levels are not fully adjusted based on changes in pre-managed
financial performance (Lintner 1956), manipulating earnings downward (upward) helps
dividend payers to smooth payout ratios in years of earnings increases (decreases). I
expect dividend payers to manipulate earnings through real activities to a greater extent
than non-payers. To shed light on the effect of dividend policy on real earnings
management, I investigate real earnings management behavior within dividend payers. I
define dividend conservatism as the partial adjustment to dividends, and operationalize it
as decreases (increases) in pre-managed payout ratios in years of earnings increases
(decreases).

2

Managing earnings downward (upward) helps payers that follow

conservative dividend policies to boost (smooth) pre-managed payout ratios. I expect

2

The pre-managed payout ratio is defined as dividends paid in year t divided by year t pre-managed
earnings.
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dividend payers that follow conservative dividend policies manipulate earnings to a
greater extent than dividend payers that do not follow conservative dividend policies.
I define real earnings management as “actions managers take that deviate from
normal business practices (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, p. 2)”, and proxy real earnings
management as abnormal cash flows from operations (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006;
Roychowdhury, 2006), abnormal selling, general and administrative expense (Gunny,
2009), abnormal research and development expense (Gunny, 2009), and abnormal gain or
loss from sale of assets (Gunny, 2009). Consistent with Daniel et al. (2008), I define
expected dividends as dividends paid in the prior year. I find that dividend payers
manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the shortfall of premanaged earnings relative to last year‟s dividends when pre-managed earnings are below
last year‟s dividends. More importantly, I find that when pre-managed earnings exceed
last year‟s dividends, the negative relationship between real earnings management and
changes in pre-managed earnings is stronger for dividend payers than for non-payers.
Within dividend payers, I document that when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s
dividends, firms which are more likely to follow a conservative dividend policy
manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent than firms which are less
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy when pre-managed earnings exceed (fall
short of) last year‟s earnings. Furthermore, I document both upward and downward
earnings manipulation for payers with and without debt.
My analysis suggests that dividend policies have an incremental effect on both
upward and downward real earnings management. My study contributes to the earnings
management and dividend payout policy literatures in several ways. First, I provide a

3

more complete analysis of the dividend policy driving earnings management. Daniel et al.
(2008) find that firms manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when premanaged earnings are below last year‟s dividends, which help firms avoid negative stock
market reactions if they miss their targets. I extend Daniel et al. (2008) by identifying
situations where managers have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings both
downward and upward through real activities when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged
dividends. Second, unlike Daniel et al. (2008) which argue that dividend restrictions in
debt contracts drive upward earnings management by dividend payers, my argument is
based on the priority and interaction of dividend level and dividend payout ratio
smoothing. Daniel et al. (2008) show that dividend threshold driven accruals
management is evident only in dividend payers with positive debt, supporting their debt
covenants argument. I find both upward and downward real earnings manipulation for
dividend payers with and without debt, supporting my dividend policy argument. Third, I
provide more direct evidence about the role of dividend policy in real earnings
management by comparing payers that are more likely to follow conservatism dividend
policies with payers that are less likely to follow conservatism dividend policies.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the earnings management and dividend
policy literatures. Section 3 derives hypotheses. Section 4 describes my data and
methodology. Section 5 analyzes the association between real earnings management and
dividend policy. Section 6 examines firms with and without debt separately. Section 7
provides supplemental test. Section 8 concludes.

4

CHAPTER2
RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Earnings management literature
Earnings equal cash flows plus accruals so they can be manipulated either via
cash flows or accruals (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser,
1999; Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). In a survey of over 400 financial executives,
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find that most earnings management is achieved
via real actions, such as delaying discretionary expenditures rather than via accrual
manipulations, such as altering accounting assumptions. Because firms are more likely to
conduct real activities manipulations than accruals manipulations, I focus on real earnings
management in my paper. I adopt Cohen and Zarowin‟s (2010, p. 2) definition of real
earnings management: “actions managers take that deviate from normal business
practices.” Specifically, I examine manipulation of cash flow from operations (including
selling, general and administrative expense, and research and development expense) and
gain on sale of long-term assets.
Since earnings are one of many signals used to make certain decisions (Schipper,
1989), managers have incentives to manipulate them to meet earnings related thresholds.
Prior literature has documented adverse valuation consequence of missing earnings levels,
earnings changes and analysts‟ forecasts benchmarks (Brown and Caylor 2005), and
evidence of upward earnings management to meet or just beat important earnings
benchmarks. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document an upward shift in the distribution
of cash flows from operations for slightly positive earnings relative to firms with slightly

5

negative earnings. 3 Burgstahler and Eames (2006) proxy for business management by
using scaled annual change in cash flows from operations and for reporting management
by using discretionary accruals based on the Jones model. They conclude that business
management plays a more important role than discretionary accruals management to
avoid annual negative earnings surprises.4 Roychowdhury (2006) finds that firms conduct
real earnings management to meet or just beat the zero earnings and analyst forecast
benchmarks.
Consistent with the importance of meeting earnings benchmarks, manipulating
earnings downward in one period helps firms to meet future benchmarks by manipulating
earnings upward in the future. Discretionary expenditures, such as R&D, repairs and
maintenance, advertisement and employee training programs, and sale of long-term assets
can be adjusted both upward and downward, enabling firms to make earnings closer to
some targets through both upward and downward manipulation (Bartov, 1993). Perry and
Grinaker (1994) find that unexpected R&D is positively related to pre-managed
unexpected earnings, i.e., when pre-managed unexpected earnings are below zero, firms
report negative unexpected R&D, and when they are above zero, firms report positive
unexpected R&D. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms defer R&D to
boost current reported earnings when pre-managed earnings are below expected earnings,
and accelerate R&D to decrease current reported earnings when pre-managed earnings
exceed expected earnings.
Cohen, Mashruwala and Zach (2009) argue that adjusting advertising is more
3

While Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document an upward shift in the distribution of cash flows from
operations for the three quartiles (the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles), they find that the upward shift of the
conditional distribution of changes in working capital only exists for the upper quartiles (the 75 th
percentiles) of the distribution.
4
In their footnotes 9 and 10, Burgstahler and Eames (2006) recognize that their evidence is also consistent
with downward business management and reporting management.
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feasible than changing R&D because advertising activities require shorter amounts of
time between the decision and execution times, and most advertising activities are not
contract-based. 5 They document that firms reporting small positive earnings levels or
earnings changes exhibit lower advertising expenditures than other firms.6 According to
Statement of Position 93-7, paragraph 42 and 43, costs of producing advertising, which
are not examined by Cohen et al. (2009), “are incurred during production rather than
when the advertising takes place.” So firms can boost producing advertising to decrease
current earnings without influencing current sales.
Similarly, managers have discretion regarding the timing of disposal of property,
plant and equipment (PPE) and investment. Bartov (1993) documents a negative relation
between income recognized from disposal of long-term assets and changes in premanaged earnings per share (exclusive of income from asset sales) for the three-year
period 1987-1989, suggesting that firms accelerate income recognition of their asset sales
when pre-managed earnings fall below lagged earnings, and defer it when pre-managed
earnings exceed lagged earnings. Since the cost principle creates the upper limit for the
valuation of PPE and unrealized holding gains are not recorded until the sale of assets,
the timing of PPE sales is an efficient instrument for manipulating earnings upward.
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 121 and No. 144 require firms
to recognize an impairment loss only if the carrying value of a long-term asset exceeds its
expected undiscounted future cash flows. So the timing of PPE sales can be used to
manipulating earnings downward. The accounting for available for sale securities
5

Adjustment of R&D involves disposing of assets, laying workers off, or both (Cohen et al., 2009). The
media-related outlays they examined are about 45% of expenses reported in Compustat. Their monthly
advertising information is from a proprietary database constructed by a media-tracking company.
6
They find no evidence that firms manipulate advertising to meet or just beat analysts‟ forecasts. Cohen et
al. (2009) explain the results as being consistent with the notion that manipulating real activities to meet a
moving benchmark is more difficult than to meet a non-moving benchmark, such as positive earnings.
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suggests that unrealized holding gains or losses are recognized in net income only when
these securities are sold (SFAS No. 115). Taken together, firms can accelerate gains or
defer losses from sale of PPE or available for sale securities to boost earnings, and they
can defer gains or accelerate losses to manipulate earnings downward.
More recently, Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2010) investigate whether firms
use accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations to manipulate
earnings. They document a negative relationship between pre-managed earnings (changes
in pre-managed earnings) and securitization gains, where pre-managed earnings are
measured as earnings before securitization gains.
Degeorge et al. (1999, p. 5) state that accruals and real earnings management,
“whether pushing earnings forward or back, are costly activities.” They find that firms
meeting or just beating the previous annual earnings benchmark (0 to 4-penny)
underperform firms just missing the benchmark (-5 to -1-penny), and firms beating the
previous annual earnings benchmark (5 to 9-penny)7 underperform firms strongly beating
the benchmark (10 to 14-penny). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that in the seasoned
equity offerings context, the negative effects of real earnings management on future
financial performance, i.e., return on assets, are greater than the effects of accruals
management.
The above discussion suggests that, theoretically and empirically, firms
manipulate discretionary expenditures and gains from sale of assets upward and
downward to report earnings closer to targets. While discretionary expenditures are
negatively related to cash flow from operating activities and earnings, income from asset

7

They recognized that this group may have reined earnings in. The results also suggest that this group
underperform the group just missing the threshold.

8

sales is positively related to cash flow from investing activities and earnings.

2.2 Dividend policy literature
2.2.1 Survey evidence on dividend policy
Lintner (1956) documents that managers are reluctant to cut dividends and target
long-term pay-out ratios when making dividend decisions. Current earnings influence
current dividend decisions through the target payout ratio. Lintner (1956)

defines

“dividend conservatism” as the partial adjustment in dividends given the current financial
performance, i.e., dividend change in any given year is only part of the amount indicated
by the target pay-out ratio and current earnings. 8 Lintner (1956) argues that this policy
helps to stabilize dividend distributions and to create a cash flow cushion to mitigate
effects of future uncertainties.
Lintner (1956, p. 100 to 101) finds that management “were generally concerned
with the decline in favorable proxies and in the weakening of their personal positions
which they believed would follow any failure to reflect a „fair share‟ of such added
earnings in dividends… Stockholder reactions in such situations have been sufficiently
vigorous and effective in enough companies that the fear of such a reaction is an effective
„burr under the saddle‟ to all managements…” Twenty-six out of the 28 sample
companies had a specific target payout ratio that did not change over long periods of
time.9
8

The model specified by Lintner (1956) is ∆Dit = αit + c [(ri Pit) – Di (t -1)] + μit, which can be converted into
Dit = αit + c (ri Pit) + d Di (t -1) + μit, where D is the level of dividends in a given year, r is the target pay-out
ratio, and P is the current year‟s after-tax earnings. c is less than 1in order to reflect dividend conservatism
and partial adjustment .
9
According to Lintner (1956), managers take into account investment opportunities, working capital needs,
and growth of the company along with other considerations in determining the target payout ratio, and they
would seek outside financing if their firms have particularly abundant investment opportunities.
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Consistent with Lintner (1956), Baker, Farrelly and Edelman‟s (1985) find that
the anticipated level of a firm‟s future earnings and the pattern of its past dividends are
most important in determining its dividend policy. They also find that managers generally
agree that their firms should avoid making dividend changes that might soon be reversed,
and that their firms should have target payout ratios. The chief financial officers agreed
fairly strongly that dividend payments affect common stock prices and provide signals
about the firm‟s future prospects. Baker and Powell (1999) also find that managers
believe firms should avoid changing their regular dividends, have target dividend payout
ratios, and periodically adjust payouts toward the target ratio. In addition to the value
relevance of dividend policy and the signaling aspect of dividends, Baker and Powell‟s
(1999) survey provides some support for the agency explanation for paying dividends.10
Specifically, more than 90 percent of the surveyed financial officers agree that dividend
payments force firms to seek more external financing, which subjects them to capital
market scrutiny.
Baker and Powell (2000) and Baker et al. (2001) conclude there is little change in
managers‟ views of dividend determinants over time, namely the level of current and
expected future earnings, and the pattern of past dividends. Baker and Powell (2000) and
Baker et al. (2001) also find that the desire to maintain a given dividend payout ratio is a
moderately important factor in determining dividend policy, and about half of the
responding firms have explicit target payout ratios.
Using a survey sample of 256 public companies and 128 private firms, Brav et al.
(2005) investigate payout policies in the 21st century. Their analysis indicates that,
consistent with dividend conservatism, about 90 percent of dividend-payers have a strong
10

I discuss the signaling and agency explanation later in this section.
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desire to avoid dividend reductions and to smooth dividend streams from year to year.
Eighty-four percent of executives try to maintain consistency with historical dividend
policies. Brav et al.(2005)‟s analysis shows that maintaining dividend levels is the main
variable in deciding dividend policies, while pay-out ratios are of secondary
importance.11 Managers believe that dividend decisions convey information to the market
and that dividend reductions have negative consequences. 12
Overall, survey research reveals that both dividend levels and dividend payout
ratios are important targets. Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) both find that
the two variable-Lintner model explains dividend changes for individual firms fairly well.
The survey results suggest that managers believe that dividend policy is value relevant,
and that signaling explanations are more important than agency explanations for
explaining dividend policy.13
2.2.2 Theoretical and empirical evidence of dividend policy
Mukherjee (2009, p. 157) concludes that “Researchers consistently report that
abnormal return of a dividend-change announcement is of the same sign as the sign of the
dividend change. Although researchers have advanced several hypotheses to explain this
phenomenon, two highly researched and competing hypotheses are the cash flow
signaling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis. According to the cash flow
signaling hypothesis, the stock price moves in the same direction as the dividend change
because dividend changes convey information about the firm‟s future growth
opportunities. The free cash flow hypothesis suggests that price reacts favorably to the
11

Brav et al. (2005) find that nearly 40% of respondents target dividend per share, 28% target dividend
payout ratios, 27% target DPS growth, and 13% target dividend yields.
12
Managers view their information conveyance as concerning the mean and variance of the distribution of
future earnings, and they believe that dividends reduce stock risk (Brav et al., 2005).
13
In their footnote 14, Brav et al. (2005) recognize that managers might not admit or realize the agency
conflicts.
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announcement of a dividend increase because this increase reduces the agency cost of
free cash flow. Similarly, the stock price reacts negatively to an announcement of reduced
dividends because the potential for overinvestment increases.”
Consistent with managers‟ reluctance to cut dividends, prior literature has
documented negative stock price reactions surrounding dividend cut announcements.
Aharony and Swary (1980) find significant negative abnormal returns surrounding the
announcement of unexpected dividend decreases for the period 1963-1976. They use both
a naive model and a modified version of the Lintner (1956) model to proxy for expected
dividends. In the naive model, expected dividends are dividends in the prior quarter. The
modified Lintner (1956) model expresses the expected change in dividends as a function
of earnings and lagged dividends, which incorporate the importance of firms‟ targeted
payout ratios. Healy and Palepu (1988) document significant negative market reactions to
dividend omission announcements. Ghosh and Woolridge (1989) investigate the effect of
growth induced dividend cuts on market reaction and document a negative stock market
response to growth induced dividend cuts, albeit at a smaller magnitude than non-growth
induced dividend cuts. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) illustrate that for
dividend changes announced during 1967-1996, firms with dividend reductions
experience increases in systematic risk and the announcement-day negative market
reaction is significantly related to the increase in systematic risk.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that a dividend payout change will elicit a
market price change if investors interpret it as signaling changes in the firm‟s future
performance. Consistent with the signaling argument, Healy and Palepu (1988) document
earnings increases after dividend initiations. Brook, Charlton, and Hendershott (1998)

12

find that dividend increases signal permanent future cash flow increases. Brook et al.
(1998, p. 49) maintain that although permanent-increase firms appear to using dividends
to signal cash flow increases in year 0, “their subsequent dividend changes in years 1
through 3 are also consistent with dividend smoothing and the desire to maintain a target
dividend payout ratio.”
Agency cost and free cash flow theory posit that the agency problem stems from
separation of ownership and management, and dividend payments may serve as a means
of monitoring or bonding managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Self-interested
managers have incentives to expand the firm beyond its optimal size to increase their
power and compensation (Jensen, 1986). Paying dividends reduces the internal cash flow
available to managers and forces firms to seek more external financing, subjecting
managers to the scrutiny of the suppliers of capital. Capital market scrutiny mitigates
both monitoring costs and overinvestment problems. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find
evidence suggesting that managers use dividend payments to help control for agency
costs. The agency cost and free cash flow theories imply that earnings response
coefficients are positively related to payout ratios. Kallapur (1994) documents a positive
association between earnings response coefficients and payout ratios, supporting the free
cash flow theory.
In summary, empirical evidence suggests the following. First, capital markets
react negatively to unexpected dividend decreases, using both a naive model and a
modified version of the Lintner (1956) model to proxy for expected dividends. Second,
firms are likely to smooth dividend levels and dividend payout ratios. Third, earnings
response coefficients are positively associated with the dividend payout ratio.

13

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Motivated by the dividend restrictions in debt contracts, Daniel et al. (2008)
examine whether managers manipulate accruals upward when earnings before
discretionary accruals are less than expected dividends. They find that over the period
1992-2005, dividend-paying firms manipulate earnings upward when they have positive
debt and their pre-managed earnings are less than total dividends in the prior year.
Consistent with their contract covenant argument, they find no upward accruals
management for dividend payers without debt.
Managers want to maintain a consistent dividend policy, and they would sell
assets, lay off employees, borrow heavily, or bypass positive net present value projects
before they would cut dividends (Brav et al., 2005). Given the dominance of the dividend
level target (Baker and Powell, 2000; Baker et al., 2001; and Brav et al., 2005), I expect
that managers focus on the expected dividend level before they consider the expected
dividend payout ratio. When pre-managed earnings fall short of expected dividends,
maintaining the expected dividends results in a payout ratio of over 100 percent, giving
rise to the problem of dividend sustainability.14 Manipulating earnings upward through
real activities helps firms smooth the payout ratio while meeting dividend targets, and
increases firms‟ capacity to pay cash dividends. I expect that dividend payers will

14

The payout ratio will exceed 100 percent if earnings are smaller than dividend payments. The higher the
current payout ratio, especially when it exceeds 100 percent, the more difficult it is for managers to achieve
the current payout ratio in the future. On the other hand, money managers regard a payout ratio below 60%
as comfortable since it measures dividend sustainability (Hogan, 2010; Laise 2010).
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manipulate earnings upward to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings when premanaged earnings are below expected dividend levels. Consistent with Daniel et al.
(2008), I define dividend payers as firms that paid dividends in the prior year, and I proxy
expected dividends as dividends paid in the prior year. For non-payers, I proxy expected
dividends as zero. My first hypothesis is:
H1: Dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to meet
dividend level targets when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends.
The Daniel et al. (2008) study has two unresolved issues. First, it makes no
accruals management predictions when pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend
levels. To address this issue, my second and third hypotheses focus on situations where
pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend levels.15
Daniel et al. (2008) find that firms manipulate earnings upward to maintain
dividend levels, and the analysis in section 2.2 suggests that smoothing the dividend level
and the pay-out ratio is important to managers. The earnings management literature
suggests that firms have incentives to manipulate earnings downward when pre-managed
earnings exceed expected earnings and upward when pre-managed earnings fall short of
expected earnings. I proxy expected earnings as earnings in the prior year. I argue that
when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends, dividend payers have stronger
incentives to manipulate earnings downward (upward) than non-payers in years of
earnings increases (decreases) to smooth payout ratios and dividend levels. When premanaged earnings exceed last year‟s dividends and earnings, increases in current
dividends increase the historical dividend benchmark for future periods. If managers want

15

For non-payers, the classification of whether or not pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend
levels is based on whether or not the firm reports profits because expected dividends are zero in this case.
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to smooth dividend streams and do not fully adjust dividends as suggested by earnings
increases, the current dividend to earnings ratio falls below the target payout ratio. I
define this partial adjustment as dividend conservatism. Manipulating earnings downward
helps dividend payers mitigate the decline in payout ratios while smoothing dividends.16
On the other hand, when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged dividends but fall short of
lagged earnings, firms have incentives to maintain their dividend levels. If managers do
not decrease dividends as suggested by earnings declines, the current dividend to
earnings ratio exceeds the target payout ratio, increasing the payout ratio benchmark for
future periods. Manipulating earnings upward helps payers to smooth payout ratios while
maintaining dividend levels. My hypotheses 2a and 2b are:
H2a: Dividend payers manipulate earnings downward through real activities to a
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed both last
year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings.
H2b: Dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed last year‟s
dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings.
My above discussion about the difference between payers and non-payers is built
on the argument that payers follow a conservative dividend policy and try to smooth
payout ratios. To shed light on the effect of dividend policy on earnings management, I
identify payers that are likely to follow a conservative policy and examine the difference
in earnings management behavior of payers. I define the pre-managed payout ratio as
dividends paid in year t divided by year t pre-managed earnings. When pre-managed

16

Lintner (1956) finds that managers feel pressure to increase dividend distributions when there is a
substantial increase in profitability.
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earnings exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings, suspect payers are
those most likely to follow conservative dividend policies and thus experience decreases
in pre-managed payout ratios in years of earnings increases. In contrast, non-suspect
payers are those least likely to follow conservative dividend policies. However, when
pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings,
suspect payers are those with increases in pre-managed payout ratios. Manipulating
earnings downward (upward) helps suspect payers mitigate declines (increases) in payout
ratios when pre-managed earnings exceed (fall short of) last year‟s earnings. I expect that
suspect payers manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent to smooth
dividend levels and payout ratios than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings
exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings (when pre-managed earnings
exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings). If dividend policy is
irrelevant to financial reporting choices, I should not observe any difference in upward or
downward earnings management between suspect payers and non-suspect payers. My
third hypothesis examines differences between suspect and non-suspect dividend payers:
H3a: Suspect dividend payers manipulate earnings downward through real
activities to a greater extent than non-suspect dividend payers when pre-managed
earnings equal or exceed both last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings.
H3b: Suspect dividend payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities
to a greater extent than non-suspect dividend payers when pre-managed earnings equal or
exceed last year‟s dividends but are below last year‟s earnings.
The second unresolved question in Daniel et al.‟s (2008) study is whether
dividend paying firms without debt manipulate earnings via real activities manipulation. I
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discuss more about this issue in section 6. Appendix A contains a comprehensive
description of all the variables I use in my study. Appendix B provides illustrations for
sample classification.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

I examine the direction and magnitude of manipulation of cash flow from
operations (CFO), selling, general and administrative expense (SGA), research and
development expense (RD), and gain from sale of assets (GAIN). My sample consists of
all firms in Compustat‟s Execucomp database between 1992 and 2009 with sufficient
annual data to calculate the stated variables shown in Appendix A. Consistent with prior
literature I omit firms in regulated industries, banks, and financial institutions
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Daniel et al., 2008). To control for outliers, I delete firm-years
with dividends and payout ratios at the extreme 99th percentile levels and all the other
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles of their respective distributions (Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997; Dechow, Kothari and Watts, 1998; Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003).17
I estimate abnormal cash flows using a modified version of the Roychowdhury
(2006) CFO model. Specifically, I regresses CFOt/At-1 (CFOt = cash flow from operations;
At-1 = last year‟s total assets) on an intercept, a scaled intercept 1/At-1, sales (Salest/At-1),
and change in sales (SCt /At-1). To control for the effects of firm characteristics on firms‟
ability to generate cash flows from sales within an industry-year, I also include
profitability (income before extraordinary items (IBEIt-1/At-1), profit margin (ROSt-1 =
operating income before depreciationt-1/Sales t-1), firm size (SIZEt-1 = natural log of MVt-1,
where MVt-1 = lagged market value of common equity), and age (AGEt = years of firm
17

Specifically, outliers for all the variables are controlled for in the models to estimate abnormal CFO (or
SGA, RD and GAIN) and in the hypotheses tests. I also control for outliers in earnings available to
common shareholders (E) since I use it to calculate my main independent variables, namely, shortfall of
pre-managed earnings (DEFICIT) and pre-managed earnings changes (PMEC). The abnormal CFO (or
SGA, RD and GAIN) models are estimated after controlling for outliers for all the variables.
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age, which is the difference between the current year and the first year the firm appears in
Compustat). 18 I estimate abnormal SGA, abnormal RD, and abnormal GAIN using the
models adopted by Gunny (2009). RCFOt (RSGAt, RRDt, RGAINt) is the residual from
the cash flow model (SGA model, RD model, GAIN model), and ACFOt (ASGAt, ARDt,
AGAINt) is the dollar value of abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expenses, abnormal
RD expenses, and abnormal GAIN) obtained by multiplying the residual by A t-1.

CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1
+ β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 AGEt + έt
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5
(SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) +
β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt

Following prior literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2009), I estimate these
regressions for each industry-year with at least 15 observations. My sample for H1 (H2)
is all firm-years with PMEt < DIVt-1 (PMEt ≥ DIVt-1). For non-payers, the classification of
whether or not pre-managed earnings exceed expected dividend levels is based on
whether or not the firm reports profits because DIVt-1 is zero in this case.19 I measure
18

Industries are classified by two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Cohen and Zarowin
(2010, p. 6) argue that this approach “partially controls for industry-wide changes in economic conditions
that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time.” Additional control variables
are consistent with the prior literature that controls for measurement errors that might be correlated with
firm characteristics (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010)
19
Non-payers with negative pre-managed earnings are included in the H1 sample.
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earnings available to common shareholders (E) as income before extraordinary items
minus preferred dividends (Daniel et al., 2008). Consistent with prior literature (Bartov,
1993; Daniel et al., 2008; Dechow et al., 2010), I estimate pre-managed earnings (PME)
as Et – ACFOt, or Et + ASGAt, or Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the proxy for
real earnings management. I use the following regression model to test the first
hypothesis:

REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 NOND * DEFICIT + β3 D * DEFICIT + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK +
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 LAGE + β10 Fixed effects + ε

(1)

Following Daniel et al. (2008), the dependent variable is the dollar value of real
earnings management, namely, ACFO, ASGA, ARD and AGAIN. DEFICIT is the
shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt. For nonpayers (NOND), DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings from zero profit. The
variable of primary interest is the interaction between the dividend payer dummy (D) and
DEFICIT, i.e., D * DEFICIT. Positive (negative) coefficients on β3 for abnormal CFO
and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models) are consistent with payers
manipulating earnings upward to meet the dividend level target.
I control for compensation incentives by including bonus (BONUS) and stock
incentive ratio (STOCK) (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006；Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008).
Since Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) find that the role of chief financial officer equity
incentives on accruals management is greater than that of chief executive officer equity
incentives, I estimate compensation incentives for both chief financial officers and chief
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executive officers. I expect positive (negative) coefficients on BONUS and STOCK
variables for abnormal CFO and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models).
Following Daniel et al. (2008), I control for growth opportunities (BTM = Book valuet-1/
MVt-1), leverage (LEV = Total debtt-1/At-1), and retained earnings (RE = Retained
earningst-1/At-1). I include these control variables to be consistent with Daniel et al. (2008)
but I have no expectation regarding their signs because Daniel et al. (2008) did not obtain
consistent effects of these variables. I include prior year earnings level (LAGE) to control
for earnings management to meet the lagged earnings benchmark. Positive (Negative)
coefficients on β9 for abnormal CFO and GAIN models (abnormal SGA and RD models)
suggest that lagged earnings are an important earnings benchmark.
The samples for H2a, and H2b are firms with PMEt ≥DIVt-1 and PMEt ≥ Et-1, and
firms with PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1, respectively. I use model (2) to test H2.

REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 PMEC + β3 D * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM + β7
LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε

(2)

To examine the impact of REM‟s effect on earnings changes (Roychowdhury,
2006; Dechow et al., 2010), I use an asset scaled earnings management measure, namely,
RCFO, RSGA, RRD and RGAIN. Accordingly, I measure changes in pre-managed
earnings (PMEC) as (PMEt – E

t-1)

/At-1. Negative (positive) coefficients on β3 for

abnormal CFO and GAIN models (SGA and RD models) are consistent with the notion
that payers manipulate earnings to a greater extent than non-payers.20

20

I have different estimates on the signs of β3 depending on the circumstances because DEFICIT in model
1 is DIVt-1 – PMEt, while PMEC in model 2 and 3 equals (PMEt – Et-1)/At-1. The variables are defined to be
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The sample for H3 includes dividend payers where PME exceeds prior year
dividends and payout ratios can be reasonably calculated. Following Grullon et al. (2002),
I calculate the current payout ratio (DIVt /Et) and pre-managed payout ratio (DIVt /PME t)
for firms with positive E and PME. I also require that firms have at least three years of
payout ratios available in order to measure their long-term target payout ratios. For H3a,
the sample includes dividend payers with sufficient pre-managed earnings to cover prior
year dividends and earnings (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt ≥ Et-1). For H3b, the sample
includes dividend payers with sufficient pre-managed earnings to cover prior year
dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings (D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1). The
purpose of this restriction is to examine the difference in earnings management behavior
between payers following a conservative dividend policy and other payers that are in the
same financial position. I use model (3) and model (4) to test H3a and H3b, respectively.

REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD1 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD1 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5
STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε

(3)

REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD2 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD2 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5
STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε

(4)

SUSPECTD1 in model (3) is an indicator variable for suspect payers that are
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy and thus experience decreases in premanaged payout ratios (relative to their long-term target payout ratio, AVGRATIO) in
years of earnings increases (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1 and DIVt /PMEt <
consistent with prior literature.
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AVGRATIO), and non-suspect payers are those who are less likely to follow a
conservative dividend policy. Negative (positive) coefficients on β3 for RCFO and
RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP models) are consistent with the notion that suspect
payers manipulate earnings downward to a greater extent as the increases in pre-managed
earnings get larger. In addition, negative (positive) coefficients β1 for RCFO and RGAIN
models (RSGA and REXP models) are consistent with the notion that suspect payers
manipulate earnings downward to a greater extent, controlling for the level of PMEC.
SUSPECTD2 in model (3) is an indicator variable for suspect payers that are
likely to follow a conservative dividend policy and thus experience increases in premanaged payout ratios (relative to long-term target payout ratio) in years of earnings
decreases (D = 1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1 and DIVt /PMEt > AVGRATIO), and nonsuspect payers are those that are less likely to follow a conservative dividend policy.
Negative (positive) coefficients β3 for RCFO and RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP
models) are consistent with the notion that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward to
a greater extent as the decreases in pre-managed earnings get larger. In addition, positive
(negative) coefficients β1 for RCFO and RGAIN models (RSGA and REXP models) are
consistent with the notion that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward to a greater
extent, controlling for the level of PMEC.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

Table 1 reports the regression results for the CFO, SGA, RD, and GAIN models
across industry-years. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), I find significantly positive
coefficients on sales (β1 = 0.058) and sales change (β2 = 0.021) for the CFO model.
Moreover, the coefficients on profitability (β3 = 0.228), profit margin (β4 = 0.465) and
firm size (β5 = 0.006) are significantly positive, while the coefficient on firm age is
significantly negative (β6 = -0.000). For the SGA model, consistent with Gunny (2009), I
find a significantly negative coefficient on firm size (β1 = -0.14), and significantly
positive coefficients on Tobin‟s Q (β2 = 0.015), internal funds (β3 = 0.058), and sales
change (β4 = 0.111). I also find a significantly negative coefficient on the interaction
between the sales decrease dummy and sales change (β5 = -1.152). 21 Consistent with
Gunny (2009), for the RD model, I find significantly positive coefficients on firm size (β1
= 0.001), internal funds (β3 = 0.042), and last year‟s RD (β4 = 0.788).22 Also consistent
with Gunny (2009), for the GAIN model, the coefficients on internal funds (β3 = 0.004)
and sale of PPE (β4 = 0.439) are significantly positive. Unlike Gunny (2009) who found
a significantly negative coefficient on Tobin‟s Q and an insignificant coefficient on sale
of investment, the coefficient on sale of investment is significantly positive (β5 = 0.010)
and the coefficient on Tobin‟s Q is insignificant. The adjusted R-squares from the CFO,
SGA, RD, and GAIN models are 0.457, 0.209, 0.858, and 0.131, respectively.

21

Gunny (2009) does not find a significant coefficient on the interaction term.
Gunny (2009) finds significant positive coefficient on Tobin‟s Q (0.002), while I find insignificant
negative coefficient on Tobin‟s Q.
22
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[Insert Table 1]

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each model. The main dependent and
independent variables for H1 are the un-scaled abnormal values and DEFICIT. For payers
(non-payers), DEFICIT measures the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last
year‟s dividends (positive earnings). Negative DEFICIT suggests that on average, premanaged earnings are non-negative and they exceed last year‟s dividend. For H2 and H3,
the main dependent and independent variables are scaled abnormal values and PMEC.
For all the models, the abnormal estimates (RCFO, RSGA, RRD, and RGAIN) have a
mean of zero, and the estimates for PMEC have a mean of 0.01. The percentage of
dividend payers ranges from 34% in the GAIN model to 47% in the CFO model. The
average dividend targets ranges from 65 million in the GAIN model to 120 million in the
RD model. The mean of AVGRATIO is about 0.33 for all four models, with the smallest
value in the GAIN model (0.31), and largest value in the CFO model (0.35).

[Insert Table 2]

Table 3 reports the univariate results to examine the direction of earnings
management for the three sub-samples for H1, H2a, and H2b. For each group, the first
line reports the assets scaled value and the second line reports the dollar value. The
results suggest that on average, firms manipulate earnings upward through CFO, SGA,
RD, and GAIN when pre-managed earnings fall short of last year‟s dividends. In addition,
firms manipulate earnings downward when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed both
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last year‟s dividends and last year‟s earnings as suggested by negative RCFO and RGAIN
as well as positive RSGA and RRD. On the other hand, firms manipulate earnings
upward when pre-managed earnings equal or exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of
last year‟s earnings as indicated by positive RCFO as well as negative RSGA and RRD.

[Insert Table 3]

To test my hypotheses, I run a cross-sectional regression with industry and year
dummies as fixed effects. Table 4 provides the multiple-regression results for H1.
Consistent with H1, β3 is significantly positive in the ACFO model (β3 = 0.335, p < 0.01),
suggesting that payers manipulate earnings upward to meet the prior year‟s dividend
target. Specifically, payers report less SGA expense and R&D expense as the earnings
shortfall increases, indicated by the negative coefficients on D*DEFICIT for the ASGA
(β3 = -0.789, p < 0.01) and ARD models (β3 = -0.233, p < 0.01). On the other hand, the
results from the AGAIN model suggest that payers recognize more gain or less loss from
sales of assets as the earnings shortfall increases (β3 = 0.023, p = 0.015). In summary, the
results suggest that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate
the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to the prior year‟s dividend, consistent with
the notion that the expected dividend is an important earnings benchmark.

[Insert Table 4]
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Table 5 provides the multiple-regression results for H2. Panel A shows that
consistent with H2a, β3 is significantly negative in the RCFO model (β3 = -0.231, p <
0.01), suggesting that payers manipulate earnings downward through real activities to a
greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed both last year‟s
dividends and earnings. Specifically, payers report more SGA expense and R&D expense
as earnings increases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients on D*PMEC for
both the RSGA (β3 = 0.612, p < 0.01) and RRD models (β3 = 0.025, p = 0.075). In
addition, the results from the RGAIN model suggest that payers recognize fewer gains or
more losses than non-payers as earnings increases get larger (β3 = -0.024, p <0.01). In
summary, the results suggest that payers manipulate earnings downward through real
activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed both last
year‟s dividends and earnings.
Panel B shows that consistent with H2b, β3 is significantly negative in the RCFO
model (β3 = -0.211, p < 0.01), suggesting that payers manipulate earnings upward through
real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last
year‟s dividends but fall short of last year earnings. Specifically, payers report less SGA
and R&D expense as earnings decreases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients
on D*PMEC for the RSGA model (β3 = 0.183, p < 0.01) and RRD model (β3 = 0.053, p =
0.087). On the other hand, the results from the RGAIN model suggest that payers do not
manipulate sales of assets to improve earnings after controlling for compensation
incentives. In summary, the results suggest that payers manipulate earnings upward
through real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when pre-managed earnings
exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of last year‟s earnings.
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[Insert Table 5]

Table 6 examines differences among dividend payers. Panels A and B report
results for H3a and H3b, respectively. Consistent with H3a (Panel A), β1 and β3 are
significantly negative in the RCFO model (β1 = -0.013, p < 0.01, and β3 = -0.233, p <
0.01), suggesting that suspect payers manipulate earnings downward through real
activities to a greater extent than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed
both last year‟s dividends and earnings. Specifically, suspect payers report more SGA
expense as earnings increases get larger, indicated by the positive coefficients on
SUSPECTD1*PMEC for the RSGA model (β3 = 0.204, p = 0.062), and they on average
recognize more SGA expense (β1 = 0.009, p = 0.018). For the RRD model, while the
coefficient on SUSPECTD1*PMEC is insignificant, the coefficient on suspect payer
dummy (SUSPECTD1) is significantly positive (β1 = 0.002, p = 0.034), suggesting that
suspect payers on average report larger R&D expense, controlling for the level of PMEC.
On the other hand, the negative coefficient on SUSPECTD1 for the RGAIN model
suggests that suspect payers on average recognize less gains or more losses than nonsuspect payers to manipulate earnings downward (β1 = -0.002, p < 0.01) , controlling for
the level of PMEC. In summary, the results suggest that suspect payers manipulate
earnings downward through real activities to a greater extent than non-payers when premanaged earnings exceed last year‟s dividends and earnings.
Consistent with H3b (Panel B), β1 is significantly positive (β1 = 0.008, p < 0.01)
and β3 is significantly negative (β3 = -0.189, p < 0.01) in the RCFO model, suggesting
that suspect payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a greater extent
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than non-suspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall
short of last year‟s earnings. Specifically, payers report less SGA expense as earnings
decreases get larger, indicated by a positive coefficient on SUSPECTD2*PMEC (β3 =
0.427, p < 0.01) for the RSGA model, and they on average recognize less SGA expense
(β1 = -0.013, p <0.01). For the RRD model, while the coefficient on SUSPECTD2*PMEC
is insignificant, the coefficient on the suspect payer dummy (SUSPECTD2) is
significantly negative (β1 = -0.002, p = 0.065), suggesting that suspect payers on average
report lower R&D expense, controlling for the level of PMEC. On the other hand, the
positive coefficient on SUSPECTD2 for the RGAIN model suggests that suspect payers
on average recognize more gains or less losses than non-suspect payers to manipulate
earnings upward (β1 = 0.003, p = 0.012). In summary, the results suggest that suspect
payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to a greater extent than nonsuspect payers when pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends but fall short of
last year‟s earnings.

[Insert Table 6]
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CHAPTER 6
DIVIDEND PAYING FIRMS WITHOUT DEBT

The second unsolved question in Daniel et al.‟s (2008) study is whether dividend
paying firms without debt manipulate earnings via real activities. Prior literature shows
that firms‟ ability to manipulate accruals may be restricted (Dechow and Skinner, 2000;
Barton and Simko, 2002; Brown and Pinello, 2007; Cohen et al., 2008), and that firms are
more likely to manage real activities than accruals (Graham et al., 2005; Brav et al.,
2005). Unlike accruals management, real earnings management affects cash flows. Thus,
unlike accruals management, real earnings management affects firms‟ ability to pay cash
dividends. As such, I expect that real earnings manipulation is a more powerful test of
dividend policy driving earnings management than accruals management.
My prediction for H1 is consistent with the debt covenant argument of Daniel et al.
(2008). However, my argument is based on the priority and interaction of dividend level
and dividend payout ratio smoothing, which predicts similar results for dividend payers
with debt and those without debt. To provide support for the dividend policy related
earnings management argument, I investigate two types of dividend payers separately:
those with positive debt and those with zero debt. 23
Table 7 reports the regression results for firms with and without debt. For brevity,
I only report coefficients on variables pertinent to my hypothesis tests. Panel A shows
that payers manipulate CFO upward and/or manipulate SGA downward to mitigate the
shortfall of PME relative to last period‟s dividends regardless of whether or not they have

23

Similar to Daniel et al. (2008), I examine both public and private debt. The data are obtained from
Compustat. No debt means zero “Long-Term Debt” and zero “Debt in Current Liabilities”.
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debt. Panel B indicates that payers manipulate CFO or GAIN downward, and/or SGA
upward to a greater extent than non-payers when PME exceeds both last year‟s dividends
and earnings, in cases of positive or zero debt. Panel C reports that payers manipulate
CFO upward to a greater extent than non-payers when PME exceeds last year‟s dividends
but fall short of last year‟s earnings, in cases of positive or zero debt. Under this situation,
payers with debt are more likely to deduct RD expenses, while payers without debt are
more likely to reduce SGA expenses. In summary, my results suggest that payers
manipulate earnings through real activities to maintain consistency with their dividend
policies regardless of whether or not they have debt.

[Insert Table 7]
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CHAPTER 7
SUPPLEMENTAL TEST

My main dependent variable is abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expense,
abnormal RD expense, or abnormal GAIN). My main independent variable is based on
pre-managed earnings, defined alternately as Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et –
AGAINt. This “backing out” method could lead to a potential spurious relation between
the dependent variable and the independent variables (Lim and Lustgartern, 2002; Elgers,
Pfeiffer and Porter, 2003). I conduct additional analyses to ensure that my findings are
not driven by potential spurious association by randomly assigning the calculated
abnormal cash flows (abnormal SGA expense, abnormal RD expense, or abnormal GAIN)
to the sample firms and re-estimating DEFICIT and PMEC using the new measure
(Daniel et al. 2008). This process defines earnings management as zero plus randomly
assigned measurement error. I replicate my tests of model 1 and model 2 using randomly
assigned measurement error, and repeat the process 1,000 times. The results from the
1,000 iterations represent the effect of measurement error on my proxy for real earnings
management (Lim and Lustgartern, 2002; Elgers et al., 2003). I then compare the actual
coefficients of the regressions using my proxy variable with the mean of the coefficients
from the 1,000 iterations using the randomly assigned measurement error. I calculate pvalues as the proportion of cases where the coefficients from the randomization have a
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients. A small p-value suggests that the actual
coefficients are not likely driven by measurement error. The results, as reported in Table
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8,24 indicate that the H1 and H2 results for the CFO model and SGA model are not likely
driven by measurement error. More specifically, for the CFO model, the p-values of
0.000 for H1 and H2a suggest that none of the coefficients from the 1,000 iterations has
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients, while the p-value of 0.041 for H2b
suggests that there are 41 cases out of the 1,000 iterations where the coefficients have a
greater magnitude than the actual coefficients. The H1 and the H2a results for the RD
model and GAIN model hold after controlling for the possible effect of measurement
error.

[Insert Table 8]
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For simplicity, I only report the results for the coefficients pertinent to
the GAIN model is not supported. So I did not conduct the simulation test.
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my hypothesis tests. H2b for

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS

Survey papers suggest that both prior period‟s dividends and target payout ratios
are important determinants of current dividends, and payers make partial adjustments in
dividends given current financial performance. In more recent years, dividend levels have
become a more important target than dividend payout ratios. Daniel et al. (2008) find that
payers with debt manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when pre-managed
earnings are below last year‟s dividends. I investigate whether dividend payers
manipulate earnings through real activities to smooth dividend levels and dividend
payout ratios.
Using Compustat‟s Execucomp database, I document that dividend policy has an
incremental effect on both upward and downward real earnings management. First, I
show that payers manipulate earnings upward through real activities to mitigate the
shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last year‟s dividends when the current year‟s
pre-managed earnings are less than last year‟s dividends, suggesting that last year‟s
dividend level is an important earnings benchmark. Second, I find that when the current
year‟s pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividend payments, dividend payers
manipulate earnings downward (upward) to a greater extent than non-payers when premanaged earnings exceed (fall short of) prior year earnings. Third, within dividend
payers, I show that payers that are more likely to follow a conservative dividend policy
manipulate earnings to a greater extent than payers that are less likely to follow a
conservative dividend policy, consistent with the importance of dividend policy as a
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determinant of real earnings management. Fourth, I find evidence of both upward and
downward earnings manipulations for payers with and without debt.
My study contributes to the earnings management and dividend payout policy
literatures in several ways. First, I provide a more complete analysis of the dividend
policy driving real earnings management. Examining upward and downward real
earnings management behavior is important since Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that
real earnings management has more severe effects on future financial performance than
does accruals management, and both upward and downward manipulation may adversely
impact future performance (Degeorge et al., 1999). Daniel et al. (2008) find that payers
manage accruals upwards to attain dividend targets when pre-managed earnings are
below last year‟s dividends. They make no prediction about earnings management when
pre-managed earnings exceed last year‟s dividends. I extend Daniel et al. (2008) by
identifying situations where managers have stronger incentives to manipulate earnings
downward and upward through real activities when pre-managed earnings exceed lagged
dividends.
Second, I provide more direct evidence about the role of dividend policy in real
earnings management. In addition to comparing payers with non-payers, I compare
payers that are more likely to follow conservatism dividend policies with payers that are
less likely to follow conservatism dividend policies when pre-managed earnings exceed
last year‟s dividends. My results support the view that dividend policies have an
incremental effect on real earnings management.
Third, my argument is based on the priority and interaction of dividend level and
dividend payout ratio smoothing, whereas Daniel et al. (2008)‟s argument is based on
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debt covenants. Daniel et al. (2008) show that dividend threshold driven upward accruals
management is evident only in dividend payers with positive debt. I find that both
dividend payers with and without debt manipulate earnings upward through real activities
to mitigate the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to last year‟s dividends,
supporting the dividend policy arguments.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

CFO

Cash flow from operations

A

Total assets

SC

Sales changet = Salest - Salest-1

DIV

Total common dividends

D

Dividend payer dummyt, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0 , 0 otherwise

NOND

Non-payer dummy, = 1-D

IBEI

Income before extraordinary items

ROS

Operating income before depreciation / sales

MV

Market value of common equity =common shares outstanding *
year-end-price

SIZE

Natural log of market value of common equity

AGE

Age of firm at year t, which is the difference between year t and
the first year in which the firm appears in COMPUSTAT.

RCFO

Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3
(IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6 AGEt + έt

ACFO

Dollar value of abnormal cash flows = RCFOt * At-1

RD

Research and development expense (R&D expense)

SGA

Selling, general and administrative expense, excluding RD

TQ

(MV + Book value of preferred stock + Long-term debt + Shortterm debt) / assets

FUND

Internal funds = Income before extraordinary items + RD +
Depreciation expense

SD

Dummy variable for sales decreases, =1 if Salest < Salest-1, 0
otherwise

RSGA

Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3
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(FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
ASGA

Dollar value of abnormal SGA = RSGAt * At-1

RRD

Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At1)

+ β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt

ARD

Dollar value of abnormal RD = RRDt * At-1

GAIN

Gain or loss from sale of property, plant and equipment and
investment

PPES

Sale of property, plant and equipment

INVS

Sale of investment

RGAIN

Residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3
(FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt

AGAIN

Dollar value of abnormal GAIN = RGAINt * At-1

E

IBEI – preferred dividends

PME

Pre-managed earnings= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or
Et – AGAINt, depending on the proxy for real earnings
management.

DEFICIT

Shortfall of PME relative to lagged dividendst = DIVt-1 – PMEt

PMEC

Pre-managed earnings changet = (PMEt – Et-1 ) / At-1

AVGRATIO

The average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years
of payout ratios available, where payout ratio = DIVt /Et.

SUSPECTD1

= 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1, and DIVt / PMEt <
AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise

SUSPECTD2

= 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1, and DIVt / PMEt ≥
AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise

BONUS

Executive bonust /total compensationt

SENSITIVE

0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO +
number of options held by CEO and CFO)
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STOCK

Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary +
bonus)t

BTM

Book value of common equityt-1/ MVt-1

LEV

Total debt t-1 / At-1

RE

Retained earningst-1 / At-1

LAGE

E t-1
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APPENDIX B
CONCEPT TREE FOR SAMPLE CLASSIFICATION

Dividend payers and non-payers;
PMEt = Et – ACFOt , Et + ASGAt, Et
+ ARDt, or Et – AGAINt

PMEt ≥ DIVt-1
No

Yes
==

Deficit in pre-managed earnings;
H1

Sufficiency in pre-managed earnings;

PMEt ≥ Et-1
No

Yes
==

PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1,
H2b

PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt ≥ Et-1,
H2a

D=1, E>0, DIVt/PMEt
≥ AVGRATIO,

D=1, E >0, DIVt/PMEt
< AVGRATIO,

Yes
==

SUSPECTD1=1;
H3a

Yes
==

No

SUSPECTD2=1;
H3b

Other firms
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No

Other firms
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATION OF THE NORMAL LEVEL OF CASH FLOW FROM
OPERATIONS, SGA EXPENSES, R&D EXPENSES, AND GAIN ON SALE OF
ASSETS
CFO model
SGA model
RD model
GAIN model
Intercept
-0.077*** Intercept
0.282*** Intercept
-0.006*** Intercept
-0.001
1/At-1

1.052

Salest/At-1

1/At-1

8.495*** 1/At-1

0.527*** 1/At-1

-0.038

0.058*** SIZEt-1

-0.14***

SIZEt-1

0.001**

SIZEt-1

0.000

SCt /At-1

0.021*** TQt

0.015**

TQt

-0.000

TQt

-0.000

IBEIt-1/At-1

0.228*** FUNDt/At-1

0.287*** FUNDt/At-1

0.042*** FUNDt/At-1

0.004*

ROSt-1

0.465*** SCt/At-1

0.111***

0.788*** PPESt/At-1

0.439***

SIZEt-1

0.006***

AGEt

-0.000**

# Ind.-Yr
Adj. R2

324
0.457

SDt *
SCt/At-1

RDt-1/At-1

-1.152*

191
0.209

INVSt/At-1

204
0.858

0.010**

117
0.131

*/**/*** represent statistical significance at 10%/5%/1% levels two-tailed.

CFO is cash flow from operationst.
At-1 is total assetst-1.
SCt is sales changet = Salest - Salest-1.
IBEIt-1 is income before extraordinary itemst-1.
ROSt-1 is operating income before depreciationt-1/salest-1.
SIZEr-1 is natural log of market value of common equityt-1, where market value equals common shares
outstanding * year-end-price
AGEt is the age of the firm at year t, which is the difference between year t and the first year in which the
firm appears in COMPUSTAT.
RD is research and development expense (R&D expense)t.
SGA is selling, general and administrative expenset, excluding RDt.
TQt equals (MV + Book value of preferred stock + Long-term debt + Short-term debt)t / assetst.
FUNDr equals Internal fundsr = (Income before extraordinary items + RD + Depreciation expense)t.
SD is a dummy variable for sales decreasest, =1 if Salest < Salest-1, 0 otherwise.
GAIN is gain or loss from sale of property, plant and equipment and investmentt.
PPESt is sale of property, plant and equipmentt.
INVSt is sale of investmentt.
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Panel A Descriptive statistics for the CFO model
Variable
RCFO
ACFO
DEFICIT
PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE
D
DIV t-1
AVGRATIO

Firm-Yr
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
13618
6410
4879

Mean
0.00
-20.65
-135.73
0.01
0.14
0.24
0.47
0.20
0.20
0.47
93.88
0.35

Median
0.00
-0.10
-32.47
0.01
0.10
0.18
0.39
0.18
0.26
0.00
22.53
0.30

Std Dev
0.06
249.00
461.05
0.11
0.14
0.20
0.36
0.16
0.51
0.50
201.95
0.19

10th Pctl
-0.07
-121.90
-384.51
-0.08
0.00
0.05
0.15
0.00
-0.12
0.00
2.78
0.12

90th Pctl
0.07
87.72
45.70
0.10
0.34
0.54
0.86
0.41
0.60
1.00
251.98
0.60

Panel B Descriptive statistics for the SGA model
Variable
RSGA
ASGA
DEFICIT
PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE
D
DIV t-1
AVGRATIO

Firm-Yr
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
8492
3562
2337

Mean
0.00
-27.86
-98.58
0.01
0.13
0.25
0.44
0.17
0.17
0.42
118.62
0.33

Median
-0.01
-4.31
-22.75
0.00
0.09
0.19
0.37
0.15
0.26
0.00
25.11
0.30

Std Dev
0.11
471.50
627.04
0.16
0.14
0.20
0.33
0.15
0.62
0.49
277.03
0.19

10th Pctl
-0.12
-206.70
-387.79
-0.15
0.00
0.06
0.15
0.00
-0.19
0.00
2.65
0.12

90th Pctl
0.13
156.99
139.23
0.17
0.33
0.55
0.81
0.38
0.60
1.00
292.00
0.57

Std Dev
0.03
114.76
425.09
0.12
0.14

10th Pctl
-0.02
-26.07
-337.84
-0.07
0.00

90th Pctl
0.02
17.25
36.81
0.09
0.32

Panel C Descriptive statistics for the RD model
Variable
RRD
ARD
DEFICIT
PMEC
BONUS

Firm-Yr
9170
9170
9170
9170
9170

Mean
0.00
-4.39
-122.09
0.01
0.13

Median
0.00
-0.02
-33.05
0.01
0.09

48

STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE
D
DIV t-1
AVGRATIO

9170
9170
9170
9170
9170
3792
2996

0.25
0.44
0.17
0.15
0.41
119.92
0.34

0.19
0.37
0.15
0.25
0.00
26.02
0.32

0.20
0.33
0.16
0.67
0.49
274.02
0.19

0.06
0.15
0.00
-0.23
0.00
2.65
0.11

0.55
0.81
0.39
0.59
1.00
294.00
0.59

Std Dev
0.01
30.37
297.14
0.16
0.14
0.20
0.29
0.15
0.75
0.47
146.90
0.17

10th Pctl
0.00
-5.28
-238.95
-0.09
0.00
0.06
0.14
0.00
-0.35
0.00
2.05
0.10

90th Pctl
0.00
2.81
40.54
0.10
0.33
0.57
0.75
0.36
0.61
1.00
160.42
0.54

Panel D Descriptive statistics for the GAIN model
Variable
RGAIN
AGAIN
DEFICIT
PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE
D
DIV t-1
AVGRATIO

Firm-Yr
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
5204
1777
1395

Mean
0.00
-0.14
-83.72
0.01
0.13
0.26
0.41
0.14
0.11
0.34
65.06
0.31

Median
0.00
-0.13
-28.57
0.01
0.08
0.20
0.35
0.10
0.24
0.00
17.00
0.30

RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1.
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ARD equals RRDt* At-1.
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1.
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends).
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
DEFICIT is the shortfall of PME relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1.
BONUS equals Executive bonust /total compensationt.
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held
by CEO and CFO).
STOCK is Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t
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BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1.
LEV is total debtt-1/ At-1.
RE is retained earningst-1/ At-1.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
AVGRATIO is the average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years of payout ratios available,
where payout ratio = DIVt/Et.
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TABLE 3
TEST FOR THE DIRECTION OF REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Group

PMEt < DIVt-1

PMEt ≥ DIVt-1,
and PMEt ≥ Et-1

PMEt ≥ DIVt-1
and PMEt < Et-1

CFO model
#FirmMean
Yrs
3207 0.029*
49.73*

SGA model
#FirmYrs Mean
3034 -0.073*
-213.9*

GAIN model
RD model
#Firm#Firm- Mean
Mean
Yrs
Yrs
1947 0.000
1188 0.002*
-8.59*
2.61*

6908 -0.026*
-82.67*

3884 0.072*
138.85*

4940 0.001*
0.73

2913 -0.001*
-1.61*

3503 0.024*
37.21*

1574 -0.037*
-80.61*

2283 -0.002*
-11.88*

1103 0.000
0.78

* Significant at the 5 % level two-tailed.
For each group, the first line is the assets scaled value and the second line is the dollar value.

RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1.
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. ARD equals RRDt* At-1.
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year. AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1.
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends).
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
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TABLE 4
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H1

I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are
not reported in the tables.
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 NOND * DEFICIT + β3 D * DEFICIT + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM
+ β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 LAGE + β10 Fixed effects + ε
DV
Intercept
D
NOND*DEFICIT
D*DEFICIT
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE
LAGE

ACFO
Estimate p value
0.093
0.990
-13.478
0.033
0.002
0.900
0.335
<.001
188.961
<.001
67.779
<.001
-7.088
0.220
23.061
0.139
2.489
0.540
0.157
<.001

ASGA
Estimate p value
42.795
0.003
8.213
0.474
-0.554
<.001
-0.789
<.001
-308.424
<.001
-109.940
<.001
4.666
0.712
-132.455
<.001
10.176
0.112
-0.449
<.001

(1)
AGAIN
ARD
Estimate
p value Estimate p value
6.286
0.488
-3.926
0.132
11.456
0.174
-2.669
0.336
0.009
0.604
0.012
0.033
-0.233
<.001
0.023
0.015
-107.703
0.001 54.728
<.001
-43.816
0.026
5.298
0.328
10.660
0.154
1.435
0.565
-0.033
0.999
3.984
0.489
-3.081
0.358
0.861
0.330
0.071
<.001
-0.002
0.601

ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends).
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
NOND is non-payer dummy, = 1-D.
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt
BONUS equals Executive bonust /total compensationt.
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held
by CEO and CFO)
STOCK is Stock incentive ratiot = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t
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BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1.
LEV is total debt t-1 / At-1.
RE is retained earningst-1 / At-1.
LAGE is last year‟s E.
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TABLE 5
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H2

I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are
not reported in the tables.
REM = β0 + β1 D + β2 PMEC + β3 D * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK + β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8
RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε

(2)

Panel A. H2a, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt ≥ Et-1
DV
Intercept
D
PMEC
D*PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE

RCFO
Estimate p value
-0.016
<.001
0.008
<.001
-0.197
<.001
-0.231
<.001
0.038
<.001
0.018
<.001
-0.007
<.001
-0.013
<.001
-0.009
<.001

RSGA
Estimate p value
0.048
<.001
-0.040
<.001
0.306
<.001
0.612
<.001
-0.055
<.001
-0.034
<.001
-0.008
0.051
-0.021
0.007
0.016
<.001

RRD
Estimate
p value
0.004
<.001
-0.003
<.001
-0.008
0.098
0.025
0.075
-0.006
0.015
0.001
0.491
-0.001
0.531
-0.005
0.028
-0.001
0.233

RGAIN
Estimate p value
0.000
0.565
0.001
0.191
-0.003
0.223
-0.024
0.002
-0.002
0.229
0.001
0.228
0.000
0.791
-0.001
0.331
-0.001
0.123

Panel B. H2b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1
DV
Intercept
D
PMEC
D*PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE

RCFO
Estimate p value
0.013
<.001
-0.010
<.001
-0.263
<.001
-0.211
<.001
0.089
<.001
0.024
<.001
-0.033
<.001
-0.021
<.001
0.008
<.001

RSGA
Estimate p value
-0.013
0.003
0.019
<.001
0.345
<.001
0.183
0.010
-0.092
<.001
-0.039
<.001
0.025
<.001
0.009
0.309
-0.006
0.039

RRD
Estimate
p value
-0.001
0.674
-0.003
0.030
-0.049
0.000
0.053
0.087
-0.010
0.010
-0.001
0.651
0.005
0.005
0.000
0.917
-0.004
0.005

RGAIN
Estimate p value
-0.002
0.078
0.000
0.760
0.007
0.412
-0.014
0.484
0.007
0.003
0.005
<.001
-0.001
0.459
0.002
0.419
0.000
0.647

RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
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RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends).
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings changet = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1.
BONUS equals Executive bonust /total compensationt.
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held
by CEO and CFO)
STOCK is Stock incentive ratio t = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t
BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1.
LEV is total debtt-1 / At-1.
RE is retained earningst-1 / At-1.
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TABLE 6
MULTIPLE-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR H325
Panel A. H3a, when, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt ≥ Et-1
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are
not reported in the tables.
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD1 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD1 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK +
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε
DV
Intercept
SUSPECTD1
PMEC
SUSPECTD1*
PMEC
BONUS
STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE

RCFO
Estimate p value
0.013
<.001
-0.013
<.001
-0.393
<.001
-0.233
0.028
0.011
-0.014
-0.010
-0.001

0.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
0.020
0.572

RSGA
Estimate p value
-0.034
<.001
0.009
0.018
0.769
<.001
0.204
-0.047
-0.008
0.019
0.037
0.022

0.062
<.001
0.092
<.001
<.001
<.001

(3)
RRD
Estimate p value
-0.004
0.010
0.002
0.034
0.031
0.410
0.036
-0.006
-0.003
0.003
0.006
-0.002

0.369
0.004
0.045
0.019
0.011
0.106

RGAIN
Estimate p value
0.003
0.002
-0.002
0.009
-0.063
0.004
0.022
0.001
0.002
<.001
-0.006
-0.003

0.337
0.502
0.029
0.886
<.001
0.002

Panel B. H3b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1
I run cross-sectional regression with industry and year dummies as fixed effects. Fixed effects are
not reported in the tables.
REM = β0 + β1 SUSPECTD2 + β2 PMEC + β3 SUSPECTD2 * PMEC + β4 BONUS + β5 STOCK +
β6 BTM + β7 LEV + β8 RE + β9 Fixed effects + ε
DV
Intercept
SUSPECTD2
PMEC
SUSPECTD2*
PMEC
BONUS

RCFO
RSGA
Estimate p value Estimate p value
0.016
<.001
-0.008
0.210
0.008
<.001
-0.013
0.001
-0.323
<.001
0.099
0.326
-0.189
0.057

0.004
<.001

0.427
-0.055

25

<.001
<.001

(4)
RRD
Estimate
p value
-0.004
0.045
-0.002
0.065
0.029
0.348
0.003
-0.010

0.909
0.001

RGAIN
Estimate p value
-0.001
0.579
0.003
0.012
-0.031
0.296
0.047
0.010

Sample for H3 includes payers where payout ratio and pre-managed ratio can be calculated, and which
have at least three years of payout ratios.
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0.175
<.001

STOCK
BTM
LEV
RE

0.009
-0.026
-0.036
-0.008

0.016
<.001
<.001
0.016

-0.016
0.027
0.039
-0.003

0.033
<.001
<.001
0.653

-0.001
0.009
0.002
-0.006

0.511
<.001
0.529
0.002

0.001
0.000
-0.003
-0.001

0.550
0.839
0.273
0.456

RCFO is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
RSGA is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
RRD is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
RGAIN is residual from the following regression for each industry-year.
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is (income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends).
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIV t-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1.
AVGRATIO is the average payout ratio for payers that have at least three years of payout ratios available, where
payout ratio = DIVt / Et.
SUSPECTD1 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt ≥ Et-1, and DIV t /PMEt < AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise.
SUSPECTD2 = 1 if D=1, PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, PMEt < Et-1, and DIV t /PMEt ≥ AVGRATIO, 0 otherwise
BONUS equals Executive bonus t /total compensation t.
SENSITIVE equals 0.01*stock price*(number of shares held by CEO and CFO + number of options held
by CEO and CFO)
STOCK is Stock incentive ratio t = SENSITIVEt / (SENSITIVE + salary + bonus)t
BTM is book value of common equityt-1/ market value of common equityt-1.
LEV is total debtt-1 / A t-1.
RE is retained earningst-1 / A t-1.
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TABLE 7
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIVIDEND PAYERS AND NON-PAYERS 26
Pane A. H1, when PMEt < DIVt-1
DV

ACFO
ASGA
ARD
Estimate p value Estimate
p value Estimate p value

Debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*DEFICIT

2,771
0.340

Zero debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*DEFICIT

436
0.335

<.001

2,534
-0.788

<.001

500
-0.594

<.001

1,595
-0.235

<.001

352
0.017

AGAIN
Estimate
p value

<.001

938
0.027

0.012

0.721

250
-0.007

0.235

Panel B. H2a, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1, and PMEt ≥ Et-1
DV

RCFO
Estimate p value

Debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*PMEC

6056
-0.228

Zero debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*PMEC

852
-0.211

RSGA
RRD
Estimate p value Estimate p value

<.001

3,254
0.633

<.001

630
0.374

<.001

4,111
0.034

<.001

829
-0.000

RGAIN
Estimate p value

0.018

2,302
-0.023

0.017

0.999

611
-0.033

0.011

Panel C. H2b, when PMEt ≥ DIVt-1 and PMEt < Et-1
DV

RCFO
RSGA
RRD
Estimate p value Estimate p value Estimate
p value

Debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*PMEC

2,970
-0.157

Zero debt:
# Firm-Yrs.
D*PMEC

533
-0.403

0.002

1,244
0.025

0.008

330
0.620

0.746

1,914
0.060

0.001

369
-0.012

RGAIN
Estimate p value

0.058

842
-0.000

0.985

0.921

261
-0.049

0.155

ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
26

For simplicity, I only report the results for the coefficients pertinent to my hypothesis tests.
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ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends.
PME is pre- managed earningst= Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividendst.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1.
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TABLE 8
COMPARISONS OF ACTUAL MAGNITUDES WITH RANDOMIZED
MAGNITUDES
I compare the actual coefficients pertinent to my hypothesis tests (Actual) with the simulation
results by randomizing the real earnings management measures when calculating of DEFICIT or
PMEC (Random).

CFO model

H1 (D*DEFICIT)
Actual Random
p-value
0.335
-0.024
0.000

H2a (D*PMEC)
Actual Random
p-value
-0.231
-0.028
0.000

H2b (D*PMEC)
Actual Random p-value
-0.211 -0.182
0.041

SGA model

-0.789

-0.146

0.000

0.612

0.031

0.000

0.183

0.121

0.007

RD model

-0.233

0.184

0.000

0.025

-0.005

0.000

0.053

0.075

0.939

GAIN model
0.023
-0.009
0.024
-0.024
-0.018
0.000
p- values equal the proportion of the 1000 iterations where the indicated statistic was more positive
(negative) than the corresponding actual coefficients.

ACFO equals RCFOt * At-1. RCFO is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 (Salest/At-1) + β2 (SCt /At-1) + β3 (IBEIt-1/At-1) + β4 ROSt-1 + β5 SIZEt-1 + β6
AGEt + έt
ASGA equals RSGAt* At-1. RSGA is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
SGAt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (SCt/At-1) + β5 (SDt * SCt/At-1) + έt
ARD equals RRDt* At-1. RRD is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
RDt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (RDt-1/At-1) + έt
AGAIN equals RGAINt * At-1. RGAIN is residuals from the following regression for each industry-year:
GAINt/At-1 = α0 + β0 (1/At-1) + β1 SIZEt-1 + β2 TQt + β3 (FUNDt/At-1) + β4 (PPESt/At-1) + β5 (INVSt/At-1) + έt
E is income before extraordinary items – preferred dividends.
PME is pre- managed earningst = Et – ACFOt, Et + ASGAt, Et + ARDt, or Et – AGAINt, depending on the
proxy for real earnings management.
DIV is total common dividends.
D is dividend payer dummy, =1 if DIVt-1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
DEFICIT is the shortfall of pre-managed earnings relative to lagged dividends = DIVt-1 – PMEt
PMEC is Pre-managed earnings change = (PMEt – E t-1) / At-1.
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